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Regional Integration Mechanisms in the Law of
the United States: Starting Over
FREDERICK M. ABBOTr

The theme of this conference is the globalization of world markets and
the ramifications of this trend for national legal and political systems. One
of the principal factors which has accelerated the globalization or
transnational extension of markets has been the formation of regional trading
arrangements (RTAs). The archetypal RTA is of course the European
Community. There has perhaps been no, more compelling example of the
harmonization and integration of national legal systems undertaken on a
voluntary basis than the harmonization or approximation undertaken by the
Member States of the EC over the past thirty-five years, and particularly
over the past several years in consequence of the implementation of the
1992 Program.' The United States is a party to RTAs both with Israel and
Canada, and is negotiating the formation of a third, the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 2 RTAs are a prominent feature of the Latin
American legal landscape, with reference for example to the new Southern
Cone arrangement involving Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay,3
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1. Moreover, the extension of the Community into the European Economic Area involves the
wholesale adoption of existing Community harmonization and approximation legislation and regulation
by an additional six countries, expanding considerably the range of application of the European
integration effort. See Frederick M. Abbott, Integration without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of
the EC Model and the Future of the GAIT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMp. L. 917, 940-43 (1992); Thomas
Cottier, Constitutional Trade Regulation in National and International Law: Structure-Substance
Pairingsin the EFTA Experience,in 8 NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
409 (Meinhard Hilf and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS].
The pace at which the 5C is extending its preferential trading regime into the former Soviet sphere of
influence is breathtaking. See European Community Commission, EC Trade with Central and Eastern
Europe: A New Relationship, EUROPEAN ECONOMY No. 52, 27, 27-45 (1993).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 8-17, 1992, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993); 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. At this writing, the NAFTA is awaiting final
ratification by each signatory country. See generally, Abbott, supra note I (regarding the Canada United States Free Trade Area and the NAFTA). See infra note 25 for citation to the Israel - United
States Free Trade Area implementing legislation.
3. See Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uuguay: Treaty Establishing a Common Market, (Mercosur)
done March 26, 1991 at Asuncion, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991).
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and the Andean Pact.4 RTAs have been formed and are under discussion
in Asia.5
An RTA is brought into being through the legal mechanism of a treaty
among the constituent member states of the arrangement.6
This treaty
constitutes the charter of the RTA and becomes the mechanism by which the
member states of the organization both guide their implementation of the
arrangement and evaluate each other's conduct for conformity with the joint
expectations embodied in the charter. This charter may take effect in the
domestic law of the RTA member states without national implementing
legislation or such legislation may be required to give the charter domestic
effect. This charter may or may not provide the basis upon which
individual citizens7 within the RTA may assert legal rights under it. The
charter may establish dispute resolution mechanisms independent of the
national court structures of the member states of the RTA. The charter may
envision that the national courts of the member states play a role concurrent
with, subordinate to, or independent of the dispute resolution mechanisms
which may be created pursuant to the charter.
Whether the national courts of the member states of an RTA may
directly interpret and apply the charter of the organization without
intervening national legislation, and whether individual citizens within the
member states of an RTA are entitled to rely on the charter as a direct
source of rights, are questions fundamental to the constitutive structure of
the RTA. The answers to these questions may in large measure determine
the overall pace of the integration effort, the consistency with, or conformity
to the charter of member state actions taken pursuant to it and the degree to
which individual citizens within the RTA consider themselves directly
connected with the integration process (implicating the democratic or
popular support for the integration process).
Because the raisond'6tre of an RTA is the removal of barriers to intermember trade, all such arrangements to some extent envisage the
4. See Frederick M. Abbott, BargainingPower and Strategy in the Foreign Investment Process:
A Current Andean Code Analysis, 3 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 319 (1975).

5. For example, regarding the ASEAN Free Trade Area, see Japanese External Trade
Organization, 1993 Report on Unfair Trade Policies, 1993 JETRO, 236-37.
6. On the legal status of RTAs within the framework of the GATT, see Frederick M. Abbott,
GATT and the European Community: A Formulafor Peaceful Coexistence, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1318 (1990).
7. The word "citizen" is used here in a non-technical sense and may encompass individuals who
do not technically qualify for citizenship within an RTA member state.
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harmonization or approximation of laws regulating the internal market. This
may be explicit, as in the case of the European Economic Community
Treaty,8 or it may be largely implicit as in the case of the proposed
NAFTA. In either case, the harmonization or approximation of laws is a
natural byproduct of regional integration. As the EC acknowledged in the
adoption and implementation of its ambitious 1992 Program, differing
national regulatory standards are a major impediment to achieving the
economies of scale envisaged by regional integration. Harmonization or
approximation of standards must to some extent be undertaken to take
advantage of an expanded market. If private actors are encouraged to
enforce rights under regional integration treaties (hereinafter "regional
integration mechanisms" or "RIMs"), the process of integration will be
accelerated. Pressure to eliminate barriers to intra-regional trade will be
created, and this in turn will accelerate the process of "denationalization" or
"globalization" of legal regimes.
The tendency of RTAs to harmonize or approximate laws is a positive
feature of these arrangements, though care must be taken in this process to
pay sufficient attention to national and local conditions which may militate
against efforts at complete uniformity. For example, in the area of
environmental regulation it may well be necessary and desirable to
accommodate different social and economic demands within RTA member
states regarding appropriate levels of protection.
The compelling reason to prefer giving direct or self-executing effect to
RIMs is not, however, their tendency to promote harmonization or
approximation of laws. The compelling reason lies in the area of social,
political, and economic policy preference; a realm where certain
subjectivities necessarily enter the analytical framework. The policy
preference to which I refer is that of deepened regional integration, by which
I refer to an intensification not only of economic interaction and
interdependence, but also to increased social interaction and political
cooperation. This policy preference for deepened integration is based upon
the beliefs that such integration enhances regional wealth generation and,
with appropriate care, will not result in adverse global welfare effects; that
such integration increases social tolerance by facilitating personal

8. See, e.g., TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [hereinafter EEC
TREATY] arts. 173, 175 & 177, reprinted in GEORGE A. BERMANN, ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW:
SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1993). The EEC Treaty is sometimes referred to as the Treaty of Rome.
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interaction; that it enhances the prospects for political maturation and
cooperation through the creation of regional political structures.
No single juridical mechanism or principle will alone create a deep
regional integration. According -a self-executing character to RIMs may
facilitate the process in several ways. First, if a RIM takes domestic effect
without the requirement of implementing legislation, the tendency of
national legislatures to interfere with or restructure the arrangement will be
diminished, thereby increasing the prospect that the norms established by the
RIM will be interpreted and applied consistently among the constituent
member states. By enhancing the consistency of interpretation and
application of the RIM at the national level, the frequency and intensity of
inter-member disputes should be diminished. This should be the case even
if national legislatures retain ultimate authority to enact inconsistent ex post
facto legislation, though such legislation might well give rise to conflicts
between members of the RTA. It should be recalled that the national
legislature generally must approve the entry into force of the RIM in the
first instance so that questions of popular legitimacy are implicated, if at all,
only to a very limited extent.
Second, by giving individuals the right to rely on the RIM directly as
a source of rights in the national court system, the integration process will
be accelerated as a broad range of issues are brought before the courts
through individual activism. Moreover, providing individuals with direct
access to the courts should enhance the popular legitimacy of the RIM by
allowing an important source of self-expression. As a secondary matter,
permitting the courts to play an active role in interpreting and applying the
RIM should, to a certain extent, reduce the level of executive discretion in
its implementation, a result to be favored when the legal charter upon which
the assertion of rights is founded embodies open market principles.
This contribution will focus on the legal system of the United States and
will consider the recent bias of the U.S. Congress toward according a nonself-executing character to RIMs to which the United States has become
party. It will also consider the theoretical case for according a selfexecuting character to the proposed NAFTA, though recognizing that as a
matter of political expediency, the NAFTA will almost certainly be denied
a self-executing character (at least initially), and that the NAFTA may not
in fact come into force. Regardless of the outcome of the NAFTA approval
process, the question of whether the economic integration commitments of
the United States will be accorded a self-executing character will be
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important as the future of U.S. trading commitments unfolds. Consistent
with the general thesis of this contribution, it is suggested that there is no
persuasive reason for denying a self-executing character to all or at least
substantial parts of the NAFTA and similar future U.S. RTA commitments.
It is suggested that the U.S. Congress may play an important role in
encouraging U.S. trading partners to respect international economic norms
by permitting RIMs to take direct effect in the United States, thereby
allowing the United States to serve as a model to other nations.
I. THE SELF-EXECUTING OR NON-SELF-EXECUTING
CHARACTER OF

RIMS

A. Self-Execution and Trade Treaties
RIMs are treaties under international law. 9 Under international and
U.S. constitutional law, a treaty may be self-executing. A self-executing
treaty does not require national implementing legislation before it can be
relied upon by an individual as a source of rights.1" The Supreme Court
of the United States has long recognized that treaties may be self-executing
and have direct effect in the law of the United States." Whether or not a
treaty is self-executing is a matter to be determined by the courts through
the application of international legal rules of treaty interpretation in the
context of the national constitution. U.S. courts have articulated the test of

9. According to Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, a
treaty is an agreement between states in written form governed by international law. See generally Stefan
A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of US. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and
Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI-KENT L. REV. 571, 574-76 (1991) [hereinafter Riesenfeld & Abbott];
Foreword: Symposium on ParliamentaryParticipationin the Making and Operation of Treaties, 67
CHI-KENT L. REV. 293 (1991) [hereinafter Foreword]. As of June 1993, the NAFTA, while signed by
the heads of state of Canada, Mexico, and the United States, had not yet been approved by the
legislatures of the three countries and had not yet been ratified, so that it has not yet come into force.
On the signing of the agreement, see Keith Bradsher, Trade PactSigned in 3 Capitals,N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 1992, at D1. For a complete text of the NAFTA as signed on December 17, 1992 see CanadaMexico-United States: North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993); 32 I.L.M. 605
(1993).
10. See Foreword,supra note 9, at 295-99.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833); Foster v. Neilson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
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self-execution in a variety of ways. In People of Saipan v. United States
Dept. of Interior,12 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said:
The extent to which an international agreement establishes
affirmative and judicially enforceable obligations without
implementing legislation must be determined in each case by
reference to many contextual factors: the purposes of the treaty and
the objectives of its creators, the existence of domestic procedures
and institutions appropriate for direct implementation, the
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and
the immediate and long-range social consequences of self- or nonself-execution. '
Both in the United States and in other countries, courts addressing whether
an individual may directly rely on a treaty look to whether the terms of the
treaty are sufficiently precise to be applied in a concrete case or
controversy. 14
Treaties relating to trade have frequently been construed to be selfexecuting, both in the law of the United States and in other countries or
regions. 5 Foreign parties have regularly relied on the terms of Treaties of
12. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cit. 1974).
13. Id. at 97.
14. Regarding Switzerland, see, e.g., Remarks of Luzius Wildhaber in PARLIAMENTARY
PARTICIPATION IN THE MAKING AND OPERATION OF TREATIES:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Stefan
Riesenfeld & Frederick Abbott eds., forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at 496-97) [hereinafter
PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION].
15. An important scholarly literature has developed on the issue of whether trade-related treaties
should be given a self-executing character. An excellent collection of scholarship on this subject is in
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1. This literature is a subset of a more general literature on the
self-executing character of treaties. See Symposium on ParliamentaryParticipationin the Making and
Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293 (1991); THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW
(Francis Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987); John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal
Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310 (1992). Considering the effect of trade treaties in
national constitutional systems, a distinction must be drawn between the issue of whether the treaty will
be applied directly as a source of individual rights and whether the treaty will have a higher status than
ordinary legislation or treaty law. Many constitutional systems accept that self-executing treaties may
be a direct source of rights for individuals, although the British constitutional model does not admit of
this possibility. See Foreword,supra note 9, at 298-99, 310-11. In most constitutional systems which
accept the doctrine of self-executing treaties, the legislature retains ultimate control over the domestic
implementation of treaty law because the legislature can override the treaty by passing subsequent
inconsistent legislation which is effective internally. The United States follows this model. Some
national constitutions, such as the French and Dutch, provide that a treaty may not be superseded by
legislative action for internal purposes. See Frangois Luchaire, The Participationof Parliamentin the
Elaboration and Application of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 341, 350-52 (1991) (in France the
superior rank of a treaty is conditional on its being applied by the other party(s)); Pieter van Dijk &
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Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN Treaties) with the United States
to protect themselves against discriminatory or allegedly discriminatory
governmental conduct and U.S. parties have successfully invoked FCN
Treaties in U.S. courts to substantiate claims against foreign governments,
for example, in support of demands for compensation following
expropriation. 16 The status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in the law of the United States has not been settled by the Supreme
Court or by a direct pronouncement at the Court of Appeals level.' 7
According to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the law of the
European Community:
is a separate legal system, created by the treaties establishing the
European Communities, which is integrated into the legal systems
of the Member States and, in the proper cases, directly applicable
in the national tribunals and whose subjects are not only the

Bahiyyih Tahzib, ParliamentaryParticipationin the Treaty-Making Process of the Netherlands, 67 CHI.KENT L. REv. 413, 422 (1991). In these countries treaty law has a higher status than ordinary
legislation. The Member States of the EC have each accorded a special status to the EEC Treaty and
secondary Community legislation so that Member States' legislatures may not override these measures'
for internal purposes. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403,
2414-15 (1991). This is in recognition of the EEC Treaty's special status as an integration mechanism.
See, e.g., Administration de Douanes v. Societ6 Caf6s Jacque Vabre, Cour de Cassation (Combined
Chamber), 2 C.M.L.R. 336 (1975) (France); Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal
Republic of Germany in the case of the mushroom importer, 73 BVerfGE 339 (1986), translated and
reprinted in Stefan A. Riesenfeld, International Trade Law Vol. 11 184 (1993) (unpublished course
materials). Regarding the trend toward the granting of self-executing effect to free trade agreements in
Europe, see Cottier, NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, supra note I at 418-2 1.
16. Infra text accompanying note 35.
17. Professor Jackson suggests that while the GATT is capable of being given self-executing
effect in the United States, its somewhat unique method of coming into effect internationally and being
proclaimed by the President give it an effect in U.S. law not through self-execution, but rather through
proclamation. See John H. Jackson, U.S. Constitutional Law Principles and Foreign Trade Law and
Policy, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 65, 81 (1993); and for an earlier, more detailed
analysis by Jackson, see John H. Jackson, The GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States
Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249 (1967). Professor Hudec is in essential agreement with Professor
Jackson that the GATT has entered into U.S. law through presidential proclamation, but, at least at this
date, is more inclined to regard the GATT itself as non-self-executing because of language in the
Protocol of Provisional Application which might be construed to have required implementing legislation
at the national level. See Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of the GATT in the Domestic Law of the
United States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT at 187, 200-01 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds.,
Studies in Transnational Economic Law Vol. 4, 1986); Fred L. Morrison & Robert E. Hudec, Judicial
Protection of Individual Rights Under Foreign Trade Laws of the United States, in NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note I, at 91, 129-30 (1993). Federal courts in the United States have referred
to the GAT in determining the proper interpretation of federal trade law. See Hudec, The Legal Status
of the GA TT in the Domestic Law of the United States, supra at 215-18, 235-37.
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Member States but also their nationals, with the consequence that
it not only may create duties for such nationals but also rights which
constitute legal assets of them."8
The directly applicable or self-executing character of the EEC Treaty
and secondary Community law (in proper cases) is of course a central
feature of the Community legal order and flows from the language of the
charter. 9 The case law of the ECJ has substantially evolved on the basis
of complaints brought by citizens of the Member States, and decisions of the
ECJ have played a pivotal role in determining the course of development of
the Community political and legal order. 20 Though it is possible only to
speculate on this point, it seems doubtful that the EC might have achieved

18. Francovich v. Italian Republic and Bonifaci et al. v. Italian Republic, Joint Cases C-6/90 and
C-9/90, Judgment of 19.11.1991 (not yet offically reported), cited and quoted in Riesenfeld, supra note
15, at 145. Professor Riesenfeld advises that:
From this general proposition the ECJ has concluded that:
1. Community law, to the extent that it is directly applicable, prevails over the domestic law,
including the constitutions, of the Member States.
2. The Court alone has jurisdiction to interpret or invalidate Community law.
3. The Member States must organize their legal systems and legislative procedures so as to
provide the necessary remedies and processes for fulfilling their obligations under the treaties.
Id. at 145-46, (citations omitted).
In the EEC Treaty structure, the European Court of Justice is granted authority to decide whether
the acts of Member States are compatible with the treaty. Over a period of years, the ECJ established
a jurisprudence which held that the EEC Treaty is directly applicable in the Member States and that the
Member States may not by domestic legislation override either the EEC Treaty or the secondary
legislation of the Community. Also, over a period of years the various supreme judicial authorities of
the Member States of the Community have held that, in areas of Community competence, Community
law is superior to that of the Member States, so that Community law and decisions of the ECJ control
in the Member States.
It is important to note that the EEC Treaty is not explicit on these points, and that the ECJ and the
Member State courts gradually carved this relationship from the EEC Treaty. Thus, for example,
Member States enjoy different traditions with respect to the effect of treaties in domestic law. In some
Member States, a treaty supersedes domestic legislation and may not be overridden by statute. In most
Member States, ordinary treaties and statutes are paripassu and the later-in-time controls.
Despite the differences among Community Member States with regard to constitutional traditions
with respect to the effect of treaties, the EEC Treaty was accorded a special status, and this special status
meant not only that the EEC Treaty would have direct effect in the Member States, but that the Member
States would create a special constitutional situation in which the legislature would not override the
treaty. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 15, at 2414-22.
19. See, e.g., EEC TREATY, supra note 8, arts. 173, 175 & 177.
20. See, e.g., Riesenfeld, supra note 15, at 143-242. See generally Meinhard Hilf, The Single
European Act and 1992: Legal Implicationsfor Third Countries, I EUR. J. INT'L. L. 94 (1990); ErnstUlrich Petersmann, National Constitutions and International Economic Law, in NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 3 (1993); Weiler, supra note 15.
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the level of integration that it today enjoys had the ECJ entertained causes
of action emanating only from the European Communities Commission or
the Member States themselves. The complaints of individual Community
citizens have brought a rich array of issues before the Court, the breadth of
which is unlikely to have been matched if governmental action had been
required to initiate petitions. Also, the Community may well have taken a
different course had each Member State been required to implement the
EEC Treaty and all secondary Community law prior to its taking effect for
that Member State. Though the extent of the slowdown in the Community
law implementation process is debatable, it is very difficult to imagine that
the process of integration would have been accelerated by such a change in
the Community legal order.
The ECJ has permitted individual complainants to rely directly on trade
treaties other than the EEC Treaty as a source of rights. 2' The GATT has
been held to be non-self-executing by the ECJ.22 However, the ECJ has
interpreted the GATT in the context of Commission proceedings under the
so-called New Instrument and this may well signal a movement toward
reconsideration of its position on the question of self-execution.23
Beginning with the free trade agreement between the United States and
Israel, and continuing with the Canada-United States FTA (CUSTA), the
U.S. Congress has provided in implementing legislation that these free trade
agreements would not be given direct effect in U.S. law.24 Ordinarily
under the U.S. constitutional system, the courts decide whether or not a
treaty is self-executing. Congressional legislative action in the case of the
free trade agreements took the form of statutory language to the effect that
the trade agreements would not provide a source of rights to individuals and
could not be relied upon to challenge federal or state action.2 ' This policy

21. See, e.g., Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg, 1982 E.C.R. 3641, [19811983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8877 (1982).
22. See Cases Nos. 51-54/71, International Fruit Company N.V. et. al. v. Produktshap voor
Groeten en Fruit., 1971 E.C.R. 1107, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8158
(1971).
23. See Frdrration de l'industrie de I'huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R.
1781, 2 C.M.L.R. 489 (1991).
24. See generally Free-Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can art. 1902,
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988). See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 9, at 639-40; Jackson, supra
note 15, at 324, n. 80.
25. The Act approving and implementing the Israel-United States Free Trade Agreement provides:
Sec. 5. Relationship of the agreement to United States law.
(a) United States statutes to prevail in conflict.
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of legislating the non-self-executing character of free trade agreements was
adopted with a minimum of fanfare or public debate and without detailed
explanation in the legislative history. The limited legislative history
suggests that Congress legislated the non-self-executing character of these
free trade agreements in order to avoid a blanket preemption of existing
federal trade law.26 Whatever the historical basis for this decision, the

No provision of the Agreement, nor the application of any such provision to any person or
circumstance, which is in conflict with(1) title IV of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, or
(2) any other statute of the United States,
shall be given effect under the laws of the United States.
(d) Private remedies not created.
Neither the entry into force of the Agreement with respect to the United States, nor the
enactment of this Act, shall be construed as creating any private right of action or remedy for
which provision is not explicitly made under this Act or under the laws of the United States.
19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988).
The United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-449,
100th Cong., [hereinafter The CUSTA Implementation Act] sec. 102 provides:
SEC. 102. Relationship of the Agreement to United States Law.
(a) United States Laws to Prevail in Conflict. -No provision of the Agreement, nor the
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, which is in conflict with any
law of the United States shall have effect.
(b) Relationship of Agreement to State and Local Law.(1) The provisions of the Agreement prevail over(A) any conflicting State law; and
(B) any conflicting application of any State law to any person or circumstance;
to the extent of the conflict.
(c) Effect of Agreement with Respect to Private Remedies. -No person other than the United
States shall(I) have any cause of action or defense under the Agreement or by virtue of congressional
approval thereof, or
(2) challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction by any
department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any State, or any political
subdivision of a State on the ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent with the
Agreement.
19 U.S.C § 2112 (1988).
The Israel-United States FTA and the CUSTA approving and implementing legislation thus
provided that preexisting, contemporaneous, and subsequent federal statutes would prevail over the
agreements. This is more inclusive than the last-in-time doctrine which grants supremacy only to
subsequent inconsistent federal legislation.
26. See UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1988, S.
REP. No. 509, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 105 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2395, [hereinafter S.
REP. No. 509] which stated, inter alia: "The Agreement is not self-executing and has no independent
effect under U.S. law. For example, to the extent not altered by this implementing bill, existing U.S. trade
laws, including the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, are not superseded by any provision of
the Agreement." Id. at 2404. See also, Jackson, supra note 15, at 324, n. 80 (regarding presidential
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result is that these agreements may not be applied by U.S. courts as a direct
source of rights in favor of individuals.27 Because of the past trend in
decision making, it is perhaps not unreasonable to conclude that the
Executive will consider proposing, and that Congress may well request, that
NAFTA approving and implementing legislation include a bar against direct
application of that RIM.
B. The NAFTA as a Case Study for Self-Execution
The NAFTA does not expressly state whether it is intended to be selfexecuting. This is the typical case with respect to treaties. Two important
factors to consider in evaluating whether Congress should exercise restraint
and permit the courts to directly apply the NAFTA are whether the treaty
language is susceptible to direct application and whether the courts are

statement that Congress wished to avoid blanket preemption of federal statute).
27. Yet with respect to this legislation, consider Trojan Technologies v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d
903 (3rd Cir. 1990). In this case, plaintiffs were a Canadian manufacturer/exporter and its exclusive
Pennsylvania distributor of products which arguably may have been subject to a Pennsylvania "buy
American" statute. Id. at 905. They sought a declaration of unconstitutionality and an injunction against
enforcement of the statute on grounds, among others, that the CUSTA required elimination of restrictive
procurement legislation at the State level. Id. at 905. The Court of Appeals cited the provisions of the
CUSTA implementing act which gave the agreement priority over inconsistent State law, but went on
to hold that the CUSTA by its express terms and by implication was not intended to preempt State
procurement laws. Id. at 907-08. While this interpretation of the CUSTA is unremarkable, what is
remarkable is that the court addressed this question at all in light of section 102(c) of the implementing
act which provides that "no person ...

shall . . . (1) have any cause of action or defense under the

Agreement or by virtue of Congressional approval thereof, or (2) challenge, in any action brought under
any provision of law, any action or inaction by ...

any State ...

on the ground that such action or

inaction is inconsistent with the Agreement."
The Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in this case is equally puzzling (No. 90-5057)
(in author's files). The Department of Justice accepts plaintiff's premise that what is at issue is whether
Congress, in approving the CUSTA, intended to preempt State procurement statutes. It observes that
"Appellants first contend.., that the U.S. Canada Free Trade Agreement, and in particular, Part Three
of the Agreement concerning 'Government Procurement' preempts the Commonwealth's statute." Id.
at 6. After referring to the language of the CUSTA, the Justice Department concludes that "[t]o read a
generalized statement of purpose as invalidating state and local procurement restrictions would extend
the Agreement beyond its specified scope." Id. at 6-7.
In fact, the language of the CUSTA was not relevant because the plaintiff was not entitled to bring
a cause of action under the treaty, and the plaintiff was not entitled to challenge an action of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on the ground that its action was inconsistent with the treaty. Neither
the Court of Appeals, the District Court (Trojan Technologies v. Pennsylvania, 742 F. Supp. 900 (M.D.
Pa. 1990)), or the Justice Department mention the express statutory bar against direct reliance on the
CUSTA. The CUSTA Implementation Act did not purport to grant a private right to challenge State
government procurement laws--or any government procurement laws for that matter.
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experienced in interpreting the kind of language in question.28

Other

28. Professor Jackson has employed the shorthand terms of "direct application" and "higher
status" to refer to the distinct concepts of whether a treaty is self-executing and whether it is superior
to ordinary legislation. Jackson, supra note 15, at 313. Professor Jackson suggests that "considerable
caution" be exercised in according self-executing status to treaties, principally because of the relatively
minor role often played by national legislatures in their negotiation and conclusion. Id. at 313, 321-29.
He similarly expresses reservations with respect to according treaties a higher status than ordinary
legislation, again because of the potential lack of democratic participation in the treaty-making process,
and because of the weakness or inadequacy of international institutions responsible for their
administration. Id. at 330-32, 337-39. Professor Jackson does, however, suggest a case for direct
application and higher status in some situations, for example, when a treaty may be used to secure human
rights or free-market reforms in countries or regions which lack traditional protections in these areas.
He suggests, with respect to treaties involving membership in international, and perhaps regional,
economic organizations, that direct effect and supremacy over subsequent inconsistent national legislation
may be desirable, at least with respect to countries in which policymakers desire to secure a long-term
commitment to market orientation. Id. at 323-24, 338.
Professor Petersmann, in the context of contending for a constitutional right of free trade in favor
of individuals, suggests five policy reasons for encouraging higher status and direct effect for
international trade treaty obligations, such as those embodied in the GATT. See Petersmann, supra note
20, at 3, 26-28. In his view, giving individuals a right to bring claims on the basis of a constitutional
right of free trade or a treaty embodying free trade principles will:
1. provide legal security, encourage reliable expectations and thereby increase the
value of international trade transactions;
2.
provide a mechanism for permitting individuals to correct market failures such as
by challenging restraints on competition;
3.
provide a mechanism to individuals for protecting themselves against government
failures such as trade protectionism;
4.
increase the scope of judicial review and thereby increase the chances that trade
restrictions will be adopted and maintained for a legitimate public purpose; and
5.
act to assure that individuals are treated equally and that trade restrictions are
transparent, non-discriminatory and proportional.
Id.
More generally, international and domestic tribunals have begun to take note of the special character
of treaties constituting integration mechanisms. The Swiss Federal Tribunal, in a recent decision arising
out of the Belilos decision of the European Court of Human Rights, disallowed a Swiss reservation to
the European Convention on Human Rights on grounds, inter alia, that the Swiss approach to the
Convention was inconsistent with the integrationist spirit of the Convention. See Luzius Wildhaber,
ParliamentaryParticipationin Treaty-Making,Report on Swiss Law, in PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION
supra note 14, text accompanying notes 72-74 (discussing the case F. v. R. and Thurgau, Federal
Tribunal Decision, Doc. 5C.103/1992/Ban (Switzerland)). The French Cour de Cassation, in the
celebrated Cafes Vabre case, referred to the integrationist spirit of the EEC Treaty as one of its reasons
for affirming that the Treaty and secondary Community law are superior to subsequent inconsistent
French legislation. Judgment of May 24, 1975, (Administration de Douanes v. Societ6 Cafes Jacque
Vabre), Cour de Cassation (Combined Chamber), 2 C.M.L.R. 336 (France).
While Professor Jackson expresses concern that legislatures will be resistant to accepting treaty
obligations if they do not control their implementation (see, e.g., Jackson, supra note 15, at 340), he
notes that in countries such as the United States where the last-in-time doctrine is accepted, the
legislature ultimately retains control over treaty operation. See, e.g., id. at 333. Even ifa treaty is selfexecuting in the United States, under the last-in-time doctrine Congress will, in any event, retain the right
to pass legislation to override the domestic effect of the treaty and it will thereby retain ultimate control
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factors to consider are whether the parties intend the treaty to provide a
direct source of rights, whether trade policy goals will be furthered by
allowing the treaty to be applied directly, and whether there are significant
risks associated with self-execution.
1. Treaty Terms and the Judiciary
The NAFTA is drafted in a highly detailed manner and certainly would
in most instances be readily susceptible t9 judicial interpretation and
application. With respect to rules of origin, tariffs, and quotas, the NAFTA
by design leaves little to the imagination of executive officials. 29

It is

important to note that Canadian negotiators articulated as one of Canada's
principle reasons for joining the NAFTA negotiations the wish to achieve
greater clarity in these treaty provisions, particularly the rules of origin.3 °
The various chapters of the NAFTA refer to detailed annexes for statutorilybased exceptions to general rules which are clearly identified.3' If a court
concluded that a particular provision of the agreement was overbroad and
subject to multiple interpretations, the court could deny self-executing effect
to that provision and thereby place the dispute in the hands of executive
authority. 2
The judiciary is clearly capable of interpreting and applying treaties
which address complex international trade issues. The federal courts already

over its domestic application. The last-in-time doctrine is a judicially created doctrine said to be based
on the constitutional equivalency of statutory law and treaty law. It provides that the last adopted of a
statute or treaty will prevail as to an inconsistency. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 9, at 577. This
would distinguish the situation of the United States and a self-executing regional integration mechanism,
such as the proposed NAFTA, from that of the situation of a Member State of the European Community
and the self-executing EEC Treaty. Under ECJ doctrine, the Member States of the Community do not

retain the power to legislatively override the EEC Treaty. Thus, if Congress were to permit the NAFTA
to maintain a self-executing character, it nevertheless would be able to react to a perceived judicial
misapplication by legislating to limit the effect of such a decision.
29. NAFTA, supra note 2, at ch. 4. NAFTA Chapter Four, concerning Rules of Origin, provides
a clear example of the detailed drafting intended to avoid disputes concerning interpretation of the
agreement.
30. See, Press Conference with Michael Wilson, Canadian Minister of Trade and Industry on the
North American Free Trade Agreement, Federal News Service, Aug. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis

library, Omni file.
31. NAFTA, supra note 2, at ch. 12. See, e.g., NAFTA, Chapter Twelve on Trade in Services
and related Annexes I and II.

32.
at 575.

Treaties may be self-executing in whole or in part. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 9,
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are the final arbiter of trade-related disputes under federal statute. The
Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit presently spend much of their collective energy interpreting and
applying complex federal trade legislation. The state and federal courts as
a whole routinely consider complex problems involving business relations
among nations. There is no reason to believe that interpretation of the
NAFTA would involve issues more complex than application of the
Sherman Act to activities of multinational business organizations, or of
interpreting the tax codes as they relate to multinational apportionment.
The federal courts have long acted to interpret FCN Treaties between the
United States and its trading partners. The issues addressed with respect to
these treaties have been both complex and of considerable political
sensitivity. Moreover, the operative language of these treaties, for example
with respect to the articulation of the national treatment principle, is quite
similar to that incorporated in the NAFTA.33
A good example is the Sumitomo line of cases which address the
question whether provisions in FCN Treaties, which guarantee to foreign
enterprises the right to employ executives of their own choosing, exempt
those foreign enterprises from application of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. In these cases, the FCN Treaties either expressly or by
implication have been held to be self-executing and to have provided foreign
companies with a basis for challenging the application of federal
34
antidiscrimination law.

33. E.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, April 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art. VII (1),
4 U.S.T. 2063, 2069, October 30, 1953, provides:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be-accorded national treatment with
respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other business
activities within the territories of the other Party, whether directly or by agent or through the
medium of any form of lawful judicial entity.... Moreover, enterprises which they control,
whether in the form of individual proprietorships, companies or otherwise, shall, in all that
relates to the conduct of the activities thereof, be accorded treatment no less favorable than
that accorded like enterprises controlled by nationals and companies of such other Party.
Article 1202(1) of the Trade in Services Chapter of the NAFTA provides: "Each Party shall accord to
service providers of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances,
to its own service providers." NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 1202(1).
34. This is not intended to suggest that the courts have found the FCN Treaties to in fact
constitute a bar to the application of Title VII. The Circuits have divided on this question with various
middle ground results. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd,
457 U.S. 176 (1982); MacNamara v. Korean AirLines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3rd Cir. 1988); Wickes v.
Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984); Spiess v. C. Itoh, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Another good example of the interpretation and application of FCN
Treaties with respect to complex and politically sensitive cases is the line of
cases involving foreign expropriations of U.S.-owned property. In these
cases the federal courts have held that provisions in FCN Treaties regarding
compensation for takings of property provide a legal standard adequate to
survive the Sabbatino presumption of nonjusticiability."
Since they have historically played an active role in interpreting and
applying FCN Treaties in complex legal and factual settings, there is little
reason to conclude that the federal courts would be unable to interpret and
apply the NAFTA. It perhaps might not be unreasonable to include in the
NAFTA approving legislation a jurisdictional provision to the effect that
claims under the NAFTA must be brought before the Court of International
Trade and appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, though
it seems doubtful that such a step is necessary. It might in fact be quite
judicially healthy for the circuits to divide on questions of interpretation and
for the Supreme Court to play a more active role as final arbiter of traderelated disputes. As the U.S. economy is part of an interdependent global
trading system, it is appropriate for U.S. courts to play an active role as
arbiter of transnational disputes. U.S. courts can and should play an
important role in the development of equitable rules of trade.
2. Intent
The intent of the negotiators of the NAFTA with respect to the question
of self-execution is not stated expressly. Since two earlier U.S. free trade
agreements were denied a self-executing character by Congress, it might be
suggested that U.S. negotiators, if not the Canadian and Mexican
negotiators, operated under the assumption that the NAFTA would be nonself-executing. Perhaps light will be shed on this issue in congressional
testimony. Whatever the stated intent of the U.S. negotiators, the first task
of the courts will be to determine whether the treaty is intended to be selfexecuting from the language of the instrument itself.36 The precise nature

35. See, e.g., Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Government of Socialist
Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984); American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
493 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1980).
36. See U.S. v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490 (D.N.J. 1978) (holding that the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations was self-executing despite an executive representation to the contrary). While the
testimony of executive branch officials is to be given great weight in treaty interpretation, it is not
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of the terms of the NAFTA gives reason to believe that the treaty is
intended to be relied upon as a direct source of rights. Moreover, it is
important to note that the question of whether a treaty is self-executing is
not to be determined by examining the unilateral intent of one country's
negotiators, but rather the collective intention of the country parties.37
The NAFTA provides for the possibility of joint interpretation of the
agreement by submission to national judicial or administrative tribunals
through agreement at the Commission level.3 If the country parties fail
to agree on interpretation, any country party may submit its own view in
accordance with rules of the forum. 39 Thus, the NAFTA clearly admits of
the possibility that domestic courts and administrative tribunals will construe
the agreement. This suggests that the parties considered that the agreement
might be directly applied by the courts in the country parties.
The fact that the NAFTA establishes its own dispute settlement
institutions4" does not determine whether or not the treaty is intended to be
self-executing. When the ECJ first decided that the GATT was non-selfexecuting in the EC, the court alluded to the fact that the GATT established
its own dispute settlement procedure as a basis for concluding that the treaty
did not constitute a direct source of rights.4
However, in two very

conclusive. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 9, at 607-09.
37. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and US. v. Postal: Win
at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892 (1980).
38. NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 2020(2).
39. Id. at art. 2020(3).
40. The NAFTA incorporates a number of dispute settlement institutions or arrangements. There
is a generally applicable arbitration mechanism intended to resolve disputes between the country parties
with respect to questions of interpretation and application of the agreement. Access to this arbitration
mechanism is open only to the governments of the parties. The financial services chapter of the
agreement provides for certain modifications of the general arbitration mechanism to be used in
connection with disputes arising under that chapter. Access to this mechanism is likewise limited to the
government parties. A separate arbitration mechanism is established for the resolution of disputes
relating to antidumping and countervailing duty laws and proceedings. This mechanism removes the
national courts of the parties from review of final administrative determinations in antidumping and
countervailing duty cases and subjects such appeals to arbitral panel review. Although country parties
will nominally remain the petitioners and repondents in such review proceedings, they are required to
initiate the proceedings at the request of private parties to final administrative determinations and such
private parties are permitted to appear before the arbitral panels. The NAFTA makes provision for the
use of third party arbitration regarding investment-related disputes. Private parties will have access to
third party arbitration in cases involving the application by country parties of the investment provisions
of the NAFTA. The country parties to the NAFTA are negotiating supplemental agreements concerning
environmental and labor issues which may incorporate additional dispute settlement mechanisms.
41. See Cases Nos. 51-54/71, International Fruit Company N.V. et al. v. Produktshap voor Groeten
en Fruit, 1971 E.C.R. 1219 [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8158 (1971).
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important subsequent decisions, one involving a free trade agreement
between the Community and Portugal" 2 and the other involving the GATT
itself,43 the ECJ said that the fact that the agreements contained their own
dispute resolution mechanisms did not determine that they were non-selfexecuting. The form and operative characteristics of the NAFTA dispute
settlement institutions do not appear to exclude a determination that the
treaty is self-executing. The fact that the antidumping and countervailing
duty mechanism precludes access to the courts may in fact suggest that the
parties otherwise contemplated that private parties might have direct access
to the courts.
3. Trade Policy and Self-Execution
Permitting a regional integration mechanism such as the NAFTA to have
direct effect in U.S. law will promote the rule of law in the international
trading arena. If a RIM is implemented only to a limited extent into U.S.
law, the United States, and foreign parties seeking to assert a claim in the
United States based on the terms of the treaty, will be required to rely on
the actions of Executive Branch representatives to enforce its terms by
political action or through the formal dispute resolution mechanisms
established by the agreement. U.S. nationals will not be able to directly
enforce the agreement in the courts vis d vis the federal government or state
governments, though they will be entitled to do so on the basis of its
implementing legislation. Under the NAFTA, a Canadian or Mexican
national will not be able to directly challenge application of the agreement
in the U.S. courts. However, they may be able to persuade their government
to act as champion in a formal dispute resolution proceeding against the
United States and will be able to rely on implementing legislation.
Permitting individuals to vindicate in the courts rights established by a
RIM such as the NAFTA will act to promote implementation of the
agreement. Without private action, the pace of implementation will be left
to the Congress and the actions of Executive Branch administrative officials.
The political branches are unlikely to have as compelling an interest in the

42. Case 104/8 I, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg, 1982 E.C.R. 3641,[1981-1983 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8877 (1982).
43. F6d~ration de I'industrie de I'huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 1781,
2 C.M.L.R. 489 (1991).
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rapid introduction of trade-related legal developments as do private parties.
Private action is therefore likely to act as a spur to a more rapid pace of
integration. If the NAFTA, for example, will have a positive impact on the
U.S. economy by stimulating export-related investment and promoting
foreign investment into the United States, then accelerating the new legal
framework brought about by that RIM will enhance this positive economic
development. It seems substantially certain that foreign-owned enterprises
doing business within an RTA such as the NAFTA would favor direct effect
because they will be entitled to invoke basic free market rules, such as the
national treatment principle, without the need for federal or state action to
implement their rights.
The more complete integration of the NAFTA or a comparable RIM into
the U.S. legal framework would likely assist private parties seeking to
vindicate rights in areas such as limited free movement of labor, protection
of intellectual property rights, and protection of the environment." While
the NAFTA, for example, extends only limited rights to Canadian and
Mexican labor, principally temporary mobility of business persons,4" the
individual seeking access to the United States should benefit by being able
to challenge final Immigration and Naturalization Service action on the
direct basis of a treaty rather than relying on administrative regulation.

44. Both U.S. citizens/resident aliens and foreign parties have access to federal courts for
proceedings against the United States government (U.S.G.) under ordinary federal trade law and treaty
law. See 28 U.S.C § 1346 (United States as defendant); 28 U.S.C § 1491 (1988) (United States Claims
Court); 28 U.S.C §§ 1581-1585 (1988) (Court of International Trade); 28 U.S.C § 2631-2646 (1988 &
Supp. III 1991) (civil actions before Court of International Trade against U.S.G. based on various federal
trade laws); and 263 1(k) (defining "interested party" and "party-at-interest"). This is not to suggest that
executive determinations under the federal trade laws may be successfully challenged. As Morrison and
Hudec point out, many presidential trade-related determinations have been held to be unreviewable.
Morrison & Hudec, supra note 17, at 114-23. The most likely claims under the NAFTA would involve
a U.S. importer of a Canadian or Mexican product seeking to challenge a customs-related interpretation
of NAFTA, for example in respect to a tariff rate. A Canadian or Mexican exporter in the United States
also may seek to vindicate its rights in U.S. courts. For example, a Mexican exporter may seek to
challenge application of customs regulations issued under NAFTA. It may bring an administrative action
in the Treasury Department and a civil suit before Court of International Claims. See Morrison & Hudec,
supra note 17, at 123-24 (regarding the right of foreign producers to challenge administrative
determinations under the customs laws, observing that "[t]he review procedure does not appear to have
a demonstrable bias favoring either foreign or domestic producers"). A party also may seek to enforce
its intellectual property rights in the United States against a Canadian or Mexican company doing
business in the United States. A claimant from nonparty country, e.g., Germany, may make a claim
under a pre-existing treaty (FCN treaty) and a court might consider a potential conflict between rights
granted to that party under the prior treaty and rights alleged to be denied by the NAFTA.
45. NAFTA, supra note 2, at ch. 16.
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Although the United States legal system, perhaps more than any in the
world, is amenable to the protection of intellectual property rights, it should
nevertheless be of benefit to U.S. intellectual property rights holders to be
able to invoke the extensive protections mandated by the intellectual
property rights provisions of the NAFTA.46 The NAFTA contains detailed
provisions with respect to health and safety and technical standards, as well
as provisions regarding the relationship of the NAFTA to specified
environmental treaties and restriction on the use of environmental measures
to attract investment. 47 Although according the NAFTA direct effect might
not permit interested parties in the United States to challenge the application
of the NAFTA by the Mexican government in Mexico, 48 it would provide
a basis for challenging the compliance of imported products with specified
environmental standards. It might also provide a basis for assuring that the
U.S. government did not permit the NAFTA to trump the specified U.S.
environmental treaty commitments or attract investments by offering to
lower environmental standards.
Affording individuals the right to rely directly on the terms of the
NAFTA and similar regional integration mechanisms may to some extent
restrain Executive Branch discretion in the application of trade law in the
United States. If a regional integration mechanism is not directly applicable,
the Executive may base trade-related decisions on the RIM even though
individuals will not have the right to challenge those decisions on the basis

46. NAFTA, supra note 2, at ch. 17. The NAFTA provisions on intellectual property rights were
based directly on the GATT Uruguay Round Dunkel Draft proposal which reflected a comprehensive
system of intellectual property rights protection. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991).
47. See Frederick M. Abbott, Regional Integrationand the Environment: The Evolution of Legal
Regimes, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 173 (1992).
48. The issue of private action in U.S. courts against the governments of Canada and Mexico
involves a series of jurisdictional issues. Canada and Mexico may not be sued in U.S. courts both per
the express terms of the NAFTA and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611
(1988 & Supp. III 1991) [hereinafter FSIA]. The NAFTA specifically precludes private action against
foreign country parties in local courts: "[n]o Party may provide for a right of action under its domestic
law against any other Party on the ground that a measure of another Party is inconsistent with this
Agreement." NAFTA, supra note 2, at ch. 20, art 2021.
Even were this not provided, a private claimant would face the hurdle of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §
1605, which would bar suits against foreign governments unless one of the express exceptions apply.
It is unlikely that the waiver, commercial, or tort exception would apply.
This article was written prior to the completion of supplemental agreements to the NAFTA and
therefore does not reflect any grants of rights of access to the courts of the country parties which might
be reflected in those agreements.
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of the RIM. Professors Morrison and Hudec point out that the Executive is
frequently granted wide discretion by the Congress in federal trade
legislation and the courts routinely find that trade-related Executive
decisions involving findings of fact or national policy are unreviewable 9
The cases in which direct effect would be most likely to restrain Executive
discretion are those in which the language of a RIM such as the NAFTA is
precise and does not itself rely on Executive fact-finding or policy
determination. This is the same as with respect to federal statutes as to
which the courts are more likely to engage in substantive review when the
standards for application are specific."
Thus, even if a RIM is selfexecuting, there is no assurance that Executive discretion will be
substantially restrained.5 ' This will depend on the way the courts interpret
Executive discretion with regard to particular provisions, just as with respect
to federal trade statutes.
4. Free Market and Redistributive Rules
It perhaps should not be automatically assumed that private actors and
the judiciary are preferable to executive discretion in respect to the
implementation of international trade rules. Professor Hudec has written
insightfully on this question, reflecting on suggestions made by Jan
Tumlir. 52 Tumlir suggested that there are two different kinds of trade rules

49. Morrison & Hudec, supra note 17, at 114-23.
50. Id. at 123-28.
51. Ordinarily a U.S. complainant can bring a claim under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
seeking a determination by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) that a trade remedy should
be pursued against a foreign government for an unjustifiable or unreasonable trade practice. However,
because of the wide latitude granted to the USTR in making determinations under section 301, it is
widely assumed that a challenge to USTR action other than on purely procedural grounds could not be
maintained. See, e.g., Morrison & Hudec, supra note 17, at 120-21. One area in which a directly
effective NAFTA might have an effect in limiting executive discretion is in respect to actions taken by
the executive with respect to non-U.S. parties outside the United States should such action contravene
the NAFTA. If, for example, the President were to impose trade sanctions on Mexico, perhaps an
embargo of a Mexican-produced product, and this action affected a U.S. importer of that product, and
that importer wished to challenge that action by the President, under current law the importer might well
be foreclosed. If the NAFTA were non-self-executing, the only party which could challenge U.S.
government action directly on the basis of the treaty (as opposed to implementing legislation) would be
the Mexican or Canadian governments under the panel arbitration procedure. If, however, the NAFTA
were deemed self-executing, and the importer could demonstrate a harm to itself, and the embargo
contravened the terms of the NAFTA, then the importer might have a mechanism for challenging the use
of executive discretion in a manner historically foreclosed.
52. Robert E. Hudec, The Role of Judicial Review in PreservingLiberal Foreign Trade Policies,
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from the standpoint of evaluating the role of the judiciary and private rights
of action. The first kind of rule is intended to provide the platform for the
conduct of liberal trade-a free market rule. Examples of this kind of rule
are the four freedoms enumerated in the EEC Treaty, free movement of
goods, services, persons and capital, and the GATT most favored nation
principle." Both Tumlir and Professor Hudec suggest that private judicial
enforcement of this kind of rule is likely to have a positive welfare effect
because a judge, in neutrally applying the rule in accordance with its terms,
will be following a coherent and rationale theory of liberal trade."
Another kind of trade rule, which Tumlir and Hudec refer to as
"redistributive," is designed to remedy alleged unfair trade practices or
distortions through "contingent protection."55 Examples for the United
States are anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws and section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974. Hudec suggests that judicial construction of these rules
may be more likely than Executive implementation to result in protectionism
and distortion of liberal trade. His thesis is that Congress either has no
coherent idea of what it is intending to accomplish when it enacts these laws
(as in the case of the anti-dumping laws) or deliberately crafts these laws to
give the impression of a tough approach to foreign trade practices, while
granting the Executive considerable discretion in applying these rules (as in
the case of section 301).56 With respect to incoherent statutes, judicial
application may result in ad hoc decisions with spurious rationales.
Executive decisions with respect to these statutes, while ad hoc, can at least
be made flexibly. 7 With respect to trade laws passed to give the
impression of firm congressional resolve, judicial application is likely to
The Executive is
result in protectionism not intended by Congress.5
expected to act with restraint because it must maintain a balanced
relationship with foreign trading partners who themselves have the right to
reciprocally apply restrictive measures to American exports or investments.
The judiciary would act unencumbered from the constraints of reciprocity.

in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 503.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at

507-08, 510.
507, 514.
511.
512-13.
512-13.
513.
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In sum, Hudec suggests that positive welfare effects of enhanced judicial
involvement in the implementation of international trade law may largely
depend on the kind of trade law which the judiciary is asked to apply.
Application of redistributive laws which lack a coherent basis may result in
increased protectionism. On the other hand, application of coherent free
market rules may have a positive welfare effect.
A regional integration mechanism embodies free market rules, e.g.,
national treatment, and redistributive rules, e.g., safeguards against import
surges. Nevertheless, under the NAFTA, the preponderance of the operative
rules grant free market-oriented rights to regional private actors, such as,
national and Most Favored Nation treatment. There also are redistributive
rules, for example, quotas in the textile sector, a general safeguard against
import surges, and restrictive rules of origin. However, these rules are
narrowly drafted because all of the country parties, particularly Canada,
feared the granting to executives of broad discretion to take protective
measures.
One of Professor Hudec's major concerns with court
interpretation of redistributive rules is that, in the United States at least,
some of these rules grant the Executive broad discretion and are subject to
arbitrary interpretation by the courts. The narrow drafting of the protective
provisions in a RIM (such as found in the NAFTA) might alleviate concern
over court interpretation and application of these rules. Although there is
no way to conclusively answer the question of whether the benefits of
judicial involvement in applying the free market rules in the particular case
of the NAFTA would outweigh the harms of judicial involvement in
enforcing its redistributive rules, this author suggests that judicial application
of the basic constitutive principles of the agreement would have an overall
liberalizing effect. This would exceed the protectionist effect of judicial
application of the redistributive rules. A RIM, including the NAFTA, must
be viewed as a whole. The NAFTA, as a whole, is a constitutive charter for
trade liberalization and not a blueprint for protection.
5. Secondary Effects
A secondary effect of permitting a RIM to have self-executing effect in
U.S. law is the example this would set for other countries. With respect to
the NAFTA as a case study, Canada and Mexico are of the most immediate
and direct significance. It appears that in Canada, at least some parts of the

1993]

REGIONAL INTEGRATION MECHANISMS

NAFTA may be self-executing." Mexico, like the United States, appears
to accept the doctrine of self-executing treaties. However, there is no
authoritative Mexican Supreme Court holding to this effect.60 It would
seem that a U.S. exporter, service provider, or investor would consider it an
advantage to be able to challenge a decision by the government of Mexico
in the Mexican courts directly on the basis of the NAFTA as opposed to on
the basis of implementing legislation. This would particularly be the case
if the U.S. party could point to NAFTA jurisprudence from United States
courts also based on a directly applicable NAFTA.
Such a mutual
jurisprudence might influence the decisions of NAFTA arbitral tribunals.
Although the decision by the U.S. Congress as to whether or not the
NAFTA may be self-executing will not bind Canada or Mexico, and while
U.S. courts do not consider whether a foreign country regards a treaty as

59. According to an International Trade Commission report on the NAFTA, treaties require
implementing legislation in Canada if they amend existing legislation, require the expenditure of public
money, or affect the rights of private citizens. This information was obtained by interviewing Canadian
and American government officials. A more in-depth inquiry would be required to determine the extent
to which the NAFTA provisions would be deemed to require implementing legislation. However, it
seems reasonable to assume that at least parts would require such legislation. Cf U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, PUB. NO. 2596, POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT app. at E-3 (1993) [hereinafter ITC Report].
60. Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution is similar to Article VI of the U.S. Constitution.
Article 133 provides:
This Constitution, the laws of the Congress of the Union which emanate therefrom, and all
treaties made, or which shall be made in accordance therewith by the President of the
Republic, with the approval of the Senate, shall be the Supreme Law throughout the Union.
The judges of each State shall conform to the said Constitution, the law, and treaties,
notwithstanding any contradictory provisions that may appear in the Constitution or laws of
the States.

See 1 DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO A.2-105-06 (Michael W. Gordon, ed.; 1993). According to the ITC
Report:
The extent to which NAFTA will be self-executing in Mexico is unclear. There is no
provision of the Constitution that addresses the question of priority between international
treaties and existing statutes. Nor are there any Mexican Supreme Court cases that resolve
this question completely. It is the position of the Government of Mexico, however, that
where there is a conflict between an earlier statute and a later international agreement, or vice
versa, the later of the two would prevail. This is a matter which may need to be addressed
by the Mexican Supreme Court before it can be fully resolved.
I.T.C. REPORT, supra note 59, at E-4.
Nevertheless, U.S. commentators who have surveyed the Mexican literature on the question
conclude that treaties may be self-executing in Mexico and that the last-in-time doctrine will be followed.
E.g., VIRGINIA A. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND NATIONAL LAW: THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AUTOMATIC INCORPORATION OF TREATIES IN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 45,
70 (1982); James F. Smith, Confronting Differences in the United States and Mexican Legal Systems in
the Era of NAFTA, I U.S.-MEx. L.J. 85, 96-97 (1993).
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self-executing as a basis for determining whether it is self-executing in the
United States, 6 it certainly seems reasonable that the legislatures of
Canada and Mexico would take note of the actions of the U.S. Congress in
determining the extent to which the NAFTA requires implementing
legislation in their own constitutional and legislative frameworks.
The U.S. architects of the NAFTA foresaw the progressive integration
of the entire western hemisphere into a single integrated free trade area.
Granting the NAFTA or a successor RIM a self-executing effect in the
United States might not have a great impact in this country since the United
States has a long history of economic governance by the rule of law. Direct
application of a RIM in other countries of this hemisphere may have a
significantly more important effect. In countries in which the market
economy has not been the norm, or in which the military or other autocracy
has governed economic affairs, the adoption of a self-executing trade treaty
which evidences the characteristics of the free market may help to secure,
both for local inhabitants and foreign investors, significant advantages. If the
use of courts to vindicate treaty-based economic rights is encouraged, this
will tend to reduce the discretionary powers of executives. This perhaps
will enhance economic security by promoting stability in expectations and
may lead to a more rapid economic expansion throughout the hemisphere.
Economic development should promote further the democratic reforms
evident over the past decade in the western hemisphere. Though it is not
possible to predict the extent to which self-execution and direct effect will
promote economic growth and the securing of democratic reforms, it seems
reasonable to conclude that in countries which lack a free market tradition,
the direct application of treaty-based norms will have a positive effect.
6. Conflict with Existing Legislation
A principal motivation of Congress in giving the CUSTA a non-selfexecuting character was that it wanted to assure that the agreement did not
supersede the existing body of federal trade law.62 The legislative history
of the CUSTA Implementation Act explicitly referred to the antidumping
and countervailing duty laws as examples of legislation it wanted to assure

61.
62.

See Riesenfeld, supra note 37, at 895, 901.
See S. REP. No. 509, supra note 26.

1993]

REGIONAL INTEGRATION MECHANISMS

were not overridden by the CUSTA.63 Congress evidenced an overcautious
attitude. It was quite clear from the text of the CUSTA that it was not
intended to supplant the domestic antidumping and countervailing duty laws
of Canada and the United States. A federal court interpreting the CUSTA
directly would have found this conclusion virtually inescapable." The
CUSTA implementing legislation largely transformed into federal law the
CUSTA rules on tariffs, rules of origin, and related measures,65 to be put
into effect through the administration of the usual federal agencies, and
66
authorized the Executive to issue regulations to implement the agreement.
The CUSTA services liberalization rules contained express exemptions
for existing legislation. Since United States legislation generally does not
discriminate against foreign service providers, there was not a significant
basis for congressional concern over direct application of the CUSTA with
regard to the services sector.67
This question must also be looked at from the standpoint of federal/state
preemption. The CUSTA Implementation Act specifically precludes reliance
on the CUSTA to challenge state regulation. If the CUSTA (or NAFTA)

63. Id.
64. Free-Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., art. 1902, reprinted in 27
I.L.M. 281, 386 (1988).
65. See, e.g., United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
449, 102 Stat. 1851, 1855-61 (1988). For example, the Senate Report on the Act said with respect to
implementing legislation regarding rules of origin, inter alia:
Sections 202(a) though (c) and (f) closely tracks the provisions of Agreement Articles
301, 302, 304 and the interpretation section of Annex 301.2. It therefore provides direct
legislative implementation of these provisions into U.S. law.
Subsection (d) authorizes the President to implement by proclamation the section of
Annex 301.2 entitled "Rules," which establishes the specific rules for determining whether
a third country article has undergone sufficient change in the United States or Canada to
qualify under the Agreement because of change in coverage under the Harmonized System.
Subject to the consultation and layover rules, the President is authorized to proclaim
modifications of these rules agreed to with Canada in the future.
Subsection (e) contains specific authority for the President to proclaim such
modifications to the definition of Canadian articles covered by the Automotive Products Trade
Act of 1965 as are necessary to conform that definition with the Agreements rules of origin.
S. REP. No. 509, supra note 26, at 2409-10.
66. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 449, 102
Stat. 1851, at § 102(d) [hereinafter CUSTA Implementation Act].
67. The CUSTA Implementation Act, for example, amended federal banking law to permit U.S.,
Canadian, and other foreign banks to deal in debt obligations fully backed by the government of Canada.
CUSTA Implementation Act, Id. at § 308. However, this change in federal law would have been
accomplished by direct implementation of the later-in-time treaty which would supersede prior existing
federal legislation. See S. REP. No. 509, supra note 26, at 67.
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were self-executing, inconsistent state law would be preempted.6" It would
seem consistent with the underlying principles of such an agreement that
inconsistent state law should be preempted. One of the central purposes of
a RIM is to provide for the consistent application of rules to all parties to
the agreement. This purpose is not furthered by the maintenance of
multiple, inconsistent state rules.69
This does not mean that it is possible to spell out in advance every
possible effect of a RIM in the domestic law of the United States. The
NAFTA is a complex arrangement which will have effects in many areas of
domestic law. Nevertheless, the major operative principle of the NAFTA,
the reciprocal grant of national treatment among the three country parties,
embodies the concept of nondiscrimination familiar to the judiciary and
largely followed in U.S. law with respect to foreign nationals today.
Moreover, one reason that favors permitting a RIM a self-executing
character is that it is difficult to determine or foresee all areas in which
congressional implementing legislation may be desirable. If the rules of a
RIM are fundamentally sound, it is beneficial that private parties will be
able to rely on it to challenge and thereby reform inconsistent rules.7 °

68. See generally Fred L. Morrison and Riidiger Wolfrum, The Impact of Federalism on the
Implementation of InternationalTreaty Obligations,in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, supranote 1, at 519.
69. Permitting a RIM to have direct effect might preclude any commerce clause challenges from
the states alleging that Congress lacks the power to implement the RIM by federal legislation. Thus it
is well accepted that the treaty power permits the federal government to preempt state law in the field
of commerce among nations. This is not to suggest that there would be a serious commerce clause
argument with respect to implementing the NAFTA. Since congressional implementing legislation in
any event would be issued in order to implement treaty obligations, this legislation would presumably
share in the character of the treaty from a constitutional perspective. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920), would render the chances of a successful challenge against use of the treaty power to preempt
state commercial regulation extremely remote.
70. Evaluating the potential impact of permitting the courts to interpret and apply a RIM, such
as the NAFTA, directly is necessarily better done after the terms of the congressional implementing
legislation are known. As this article is written, such legislation has not yet been introduced. If
Congress elects to largely transform the NAFTA into a federal statute, then the question of direct
application is not terribly significant from the practical perspective of its application by courts in the
United States. In other words, private parties will rely on the terms of the NAFTA in the courts, but as
those terms have been transformed by Congress into domestic law. If Congress intends to take this
approach, then it may as well permit the NAFTA to have a self-executing character and adopt limiting
legislation where it deems necessary. This at least would encourage other parties to the agreement to
permit the NAFTA a self-executing character. On the other hand, if Congress provides that the NAFTA
will only have effect to the extent of legislation, and Congress legislates in a limited way, then private
parties may find themselves substantially deprived of rights which they might otherwise be entitled to
invoke in the courts.
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7. A Trend in NAFTA Toward Private Enforcement
The NAFTA evidences a trend among the RIM commitments of the
United States to permit private parties to enforce RIM-based rights. The
NAFTA would (a) be construed and applied as to the country parties by
ordinary dispute settlement panels; (b) be applied by antidumping and
countervailing duty panels to pending cases or controversies involving
private claimants who may appear and be represented by counsel (though
country parties will be the formal parties); and (c) be interpreted and applied
by private arbitral panels pursuant to the investment chapter.71 It would
also be applied by national courts of the parties to the extent it is either selfexecuting or transformed into national law.
Disputes between the country parties are intended to be resolved through
the general arbitration mechanism. 72 There is, however, a decided trend
toward permitting the private parties to make claims against these
governments. First, as with respect to the CUSTA, private parties are
entitled to initiate arbitration with respect to review of antidumping and
countervailing duty final determinations.
Since antidumping and
countervailing duty proceedings are among the most politically sensitive
trade cases, the country parties have accorded substantial recognition to a
regional rule of law and have created important rights in favor of
individuals. That each country party is willing to cede the sovereign
prerogative of its local court system in this area is a positive step toward
deeper integration.
Second, and more significant from the standpoint of trend analysis, the
parties have provided for third-party arbitration with respect to investment
disputes. Parties which elect to pursue third-party arbitration will be entitled
to a neutral and well-respected decision process. Courts will act to enforce
the judgments of these arbitration panels and, by doing so, will exercise a

71. These relationships will be complicated by the fact that a U.S. federal statute adopted
subsequent to the entry into force of the agreement (or a provision of a NAFTA implementing act), will
take precedence over the treaty for domestic law purposes. See In the Matter of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Pork, United States-Canada Binational Panel Review, U.S.A. 89-1904-06 (Sept. 28, 1990),
reprinted in 3 WORLD TRADE MAT. 39, 62-63 (1991).
72. It is worth briefly noting that in their review of the CUSTA members of the GATT Working
Party expressed concern that reliance by Canada and the United States on the CUSTA dispute settlement
mechanism might undermine the authority of the GATT. See Working Party on the Free-Trade
Agreement between Canada and the United States Report, GATT Doc. UJ6927 (Oct. 31, 1991, adopted
by GATT Council Nov. 12, 1991), reprinted in 4 WORLD TRADE MAT. 5, 11-14, 30-31 (1992).
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vote of confidence in the legal authority of the NAFTA rules. Private
parties may alternatively pursue investment-related claims in the courts to
the extent permitted by the NAFTA and relevant implementing legislation.
The NAFTA will be applied by the courts of the United States in cases
or controversies involving individuals, either directly or indirectly. If
Congress denies the NAFTA a self-executing character in its implementing
legislation, private parties will rely on the implementing legislation through
which the NAFTA is transformed into national law. There will certainly be
substantial litigation in the courts, for example, with respect to challenging
customs service determinations regarding the origin of goods. The role of
the courts and the ability of individuals to make claims in the courts under
the NAFTA will be enhanced if Congress does not deny a self-executing
character to the treaty. If Congress acts to deny self-execution and
transform the agreement, some parts of it will almost certainly remain
outside the purview of the courts. Though at this stage the precise areas
which will be so excluded cannot be determined, there is little reason to
expect that private parties will benefit from the exclusions.
II. RIMS

AND HIGHER STATUS IN THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

Even assuming that Congress permits a RIM to be self-executing, under
U.S. constitutional custom, Congress will retain the power to override its
terms by subsequent inconsistent legislation. At any time it is dissatisfied
with the trend of application of the RIM, Congress will be entitled to dictate
a different result for domestic law purposes. In order for a RIM such as the
NAFTA to assume a status in U.S. law similar to that of the EEC Treaty in
European Community law, it would need to achieve a special constitutional
status, a status not unlike that of the EEC Treaty in the Member States. In
other words, in the spirit of integration, the Supreme Court would need to
suspend application of the last-in-time doctrine and refuse Congress the
power to override the treaty. Alternatively, a constitutional amendment
could be pursued to accord the RIM a special constitutional status.
Should the NAFTA, as an example, follow the approach of the
European Community with respect to the higher status of norms?73 That

73. It should be noted that since the NAFTA dispute settlement institutions would not have the
power to direct the country parties to comply with decisions, a power that is held by the ECJ, there is
a fundamental lack of institutional symmetry with the European Community. In the absence of a
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depends on the goals which are ascribed to it. The principle motive which
political leaders have articulated for U.S. involvement in the NAFTA is to
enhance American business opportunities in Mexico by (a) lowering tariff
and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, (b) liberalizing access to the
Mexican services market, (c) providing a stable and nondiscriminatory
climate for investment, and (d) providing adequate and effective protection
for American-owned intellectual property rights.74
The articulated
secondary goal of the United States is to encourage political stability and
democratic reform in Mexico toward the goal of reducing illegal
immigration into the United States and discouraging the emergence of a
radicalized state on the southern U.S. border.75 It may be hoped that by
achieving the foregoing goals, the United States might also enhance the
promotion and protection of human rights and improve local health, safety
and environmental conditions in Mexico. At this moment, however, there
is insufficent evidence that integration of the North American continent
would be considered a socio-political "meta-value" in the U.S. body politic
so as to justify recommending that NAFTA norms be considered superior
to ordinary federal legislation.76 Commitment by the United States to a
RIM with norms superior to subsequent national legislation would depend
on a shift in the tide of public sentiment.

supreme judicial institution, final determinations as to the meaning of the NAFTA would be made by
the political branches of the country parties. These determinations might be at variance with the
interpretations of NAFTA dispute settlement panels.
74. Since the United States and Canada are already parties to the CUSTA, the policy issues will
be considered as a United States-Mexico question.
75. U.S. goals in respect to the NAFTA also include providing for free movement of persons to
a limited extent, reducing border environmental pollution and providing a counterbalance to European
Community regional economic power.
76. Demand for supranational regional institutions, which have the power to override national
institutions, must be a precondition to creating regional institutions or to granting RIMs a status superior
to national norms. In addition, there must be a commitment to recognizing the norms of the charter of
the regional arrangement as superior to national legislation. Both must be present at some level among
committed political leaders and their constituencies. Political and social demands for more complete
integration were clearly in the minds of political leaders at the formation of the European Community.
While the Community experiences shifting tides of sentiment with respect to whether the pace of
integration should be slowed or accelerated, and while EC political leaders may sometimes be at odds
with their constituencies or each other over the pace of integration, clearly in the EC, integration is
proceeding at a deep political and social level. The basis for European integration is substantially
different than that for North American integration, arising as it did out of a long history of military
conflict.
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III. CONCLUSION
According to regional integration mechanisms a self-executing character
or direct effect will accelerate and deepen the integration process. The U.S.
Congress has perhaps unconsciously fallen into the practice of denying a
self-executing character to RIMs to which the United States is a party.
Unconsciously perhaps because the legislative record does not reveal a
reflective legislative debate on this subject.
Denying a complex integration treaty direct effect is no doubt less
troublesome than permitting it direct application. Direct application carries
with it the prospect that the courts will apply the RIM in some unforeseen
way or to some unforeseen subject matter. This prospect should not be
frightening. Application of the RIM by the courts in unforeseen ways and
to unforeseen subjects will accelerate and deepen the integration process.
If the courts go horribly wrong, Congress can remedy the mistake through
overriding legislation.
This is not to suggest the substitution of judicial activism for legislative
control. According to a RIM a self-executing character will expand the role
of the courts in implementing it. But this is only a byproduct of the real
expansion. Principle beneficiaries of direct effect will be the individuals
who use the courts to champion the rights they perceive to be accorded
them. The ultimate beneficiary is the society which enjoys the rights that
are vindicated.
Regional trading arrangements accelerate the process of integrating
national economies ahead of the global integration process. The accelerated
harmonization or approximation of national regulatory frameworks is a
necessary byproduct of this process. Regional integration enhances social
values by fostering mutual understanding and facilitates political cooperation
through the creation of regional implementing structures. No single judicial
mechanism or principle will alone determine the success or failure of the
integration process. Directly effective regional integration mechanisms
should operate to accelerate and deepen the process of regional integration
and should therefore be encouraged. When the U.S. Congress has its next
opportunity to approve a regional integration mechanism, it should
reconsider the policy of denying such mechanisms self-executing effect, and
start over.

